Abstract
Introduction
This article reviews the recent literature at the crossroads of international law and climate change. It focuses on books (monographs and edited volumes) and a few major articles published over the last few years. Although the review is not exhaust ive, it aims at putting in perspective a range of different strands of the literature on 'climate law', thus identifying common features and points of tension. By doing so, it intends to provide food for thought not only on the role of international law in addressing climate change, but also on the impact of climate change governance on international law. Stepping back and glancing at existing literatures may promote a dialogue between different arguments, authors, and perspectives that too often remain isolated.
Climate change is now well recognized as one of the major contemporary issues for international cooperation. However, by contrast to a significant excitement about the cataclysmic consequences of climate change in other social sciences, the inter national law community has shown a certain degree of restraint, as if the resilient structure of law could remain unshaken in front of even earthshattering circum stances. Twenty years after the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 'climate law' has appeared in the curricula and the institutional structures of relatively few universities 1 and there is no proper textbook on interna tional climate change law. 2 In most cases, climate change remains part of courses on international environmental law, treating climate change as only one of many envi ronmental inconveniences.
Yet, the recent surge in international law publications on climate change prompts the question whether 'climate law' is about to become a new international law regime, separated from the tutelage of international environmental law, with its own 'manage rial mindset'. 3 Three elements may evidence the emergence of climate law as a distinct regime, or at least as a distinct discipline. First, specific legal issues are identified with respect to climate change, relating for instance to the global responsibilities for past or current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to the urgency of addressing the harms affecting mostly those who have benefited least from industrialization, and to the legal implications -if any -of the sheer possibility of an existential threat to our collective existence. Secondly, specialized forums are established, for example periodicals such as the Carbon and Climate Law Review (2007) , the San Diego Journal of Climate and Energy Law (2009), and Climate Law (2010). Thirdly -and perhaps most importantly -a new generation of specialized researchers is taking shape. This nascent community often shares elements of a common identity: those who turn to 'climate law' are often young researchers animated by a transformative project, often retaining a foothold in advocacy, and urged by the conviction of something like having a planet to save. 4 Some contemporary developments hinder, however, the construction of 'climate law' as a legal regime. The 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (in)famously epitomized the failure of international responses to climate change: 5 States remained far from committing to the necessary emission reductions to limit the global average temperate rise to 1.5 or 2°C, and each annual climate conference is arguably a 'climate disaster'. 6 This naturally gave rise to general discontentment among the climate change lawyers, which is reflected (and has been for some time 1 A recent survey of 'climate law teaching resources' was conducted by IUCN. It is available at: www.iuc nael.org/en/onlineresources/climatelawteachingresources.html. 2 Some teaching supports are available on mitigation law, although those rarely follow a purely interna tional perspective. A recent publication, however, gives a comprehensive overview of the discipline: E.J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi, and M. Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law (2013). already) by the strong prevalence of prescriptive and aspirational works. As a con sequence of the stalled negotiations, hopes faded and proposals were reconsidered. Utopian but constructive discussions 7 gave way to more tailored, 'pragmatic', and sup posedly more policyrelevant recommendations. 8 Significantly, the once central nar rative of a global responsibility tended to be put aside: climate change governance was conceived as solidarity rather than as reparation. 9 Because of this shift of narrative, the literature on 'climate law' embodies an intense yet illdefined longing: the wide spread feeling that something should be done without -absent the strong responsibil ity rationale -being able to say precisely what and why, and soundly to justify policy recommendations.
The following dissects in vivo a rich and diverse literature on climate change and international law, written by lawyers but also by political scientists and other social scientists. The next section reflects on the aspirational literature that proposes prin cipled approaches to reconsidering international cooperation in the grim days of stalling climate negotiations, navigating in the troubled waters between 'utopia' and 'pragmatism'. It refers to a literature on 'Earth System Governance' dominated by political scientists and to a multidisciplinary debate on climate fairness. The third sec tion looks at the projects of defining climate law as a coherent legal regime -mostly doctrinal works on climate change mitigation, on compliance, and on multiple forms of liability. The fourth section discusses the emergence of fragmented climate change governance resulting from the encounter of climate change adaptation with pre existing regimes on development, human rights, and migration. The fifth section con cludes by reviewing some innovative perspectives, mostly by international relations scholars, on the 'multilevel' or 'transnational' governance of climate change as form ing a 'regime complex'.
Reconsidering Climate Cooperation in the Grim Days: From Utopia to 'Pragmatism'
An important part of the debates on climate change relates to the setting of goals for international cooperation to address climate change. In the context of the stalling of international negotiations, the previous emphasis on ethical considerations 10 was progressively replaced by more 'pragmatic' arguments. This section identifies two dif ferent contemporary perspectives. One -led by political scientists of the Earth System Governance project -echoes some of the past utopia. It stresses that climate change is a major concern of our time, but comes with little justification for its prescriptions (A). The other perspective elaborates on notions of climate 'justice' or 'fairness', but its goals are significantly limited by pragmatic concerns (B).
A Transforming Earth System Governance
In the runup to the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio, a group of 32 prominent researchers, composed mostly of political scientists and led by Frank Biermann, published two aspirational articles, 'Transforming Governance and Institutions for Global Sustainability' and 'Improving Earth System Governance'.
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They pleaded for 'human societies' to 'change course and steer away from critical tip ping points in the Earth system that might lead to rapid and irreversible change'. 12 The authors prescribed a 'fundamental reorientation and restructuring of national and international institutions toward more effective Earth system governance and plan etary stewardship', which would require 'a "constitutional moment" in world politics and global governance'. 13 Biermann et al. outlined 'nine areas where major reforms are most urgently needed', listing broad and ambitious goals: to 'revise and improve the design of international [environmental] treaties to make them more effective', to 'manage conflicts between international treaties' and to 'fill regulatory gaps by negotiating new international agreements', to 'upgrade UNEP and the UNCSD', to 'strengthen governance within and beyond states', to 'strengthen accountability and legitimacy', to 'address equity within and among states', and generally to 'prepare governance for a warmer world'. 14 This literature 15 certainly has an important role to play in incentivizing and orient ing policies, but it comes with three caveats. First, by its apparent optimism it risks eluding the necessary tradeoffs between the 'desirable' and the 'possible'. It can be contrasted with the pessimistic realism of economist Dieter Helm who identified some of the reasons 'why … so little [has] been achieved' 16 in climatechange policy:
the allocation of responsibility for the existing stock of carbon in the atmosphere (which devel oping countries point out was put there by the industrialized countries) is complex; carbon emissions per head are low in those countries most rapidly increasing their emissions; some countries (and, particularly, some countries' political elites) may actually benefit from climate 11 12 Ibid., at 1306. 13 Ibid., at 1307. 14 change, and generally the effects vary greatly between countries; there are powerful -multi dimensional -freerider incentives; the measurement of emissions (including, to list just a few, rainforest depletion, soil erosion, methane from permafrost melting, aviation and shipping, agriculture, and ocean and other sink depletion) is at best weak; and there are, at present, no serious enforcement mechanisms. 17 Helm concludes that there is little hope: 'it is hard to think of an international problem which lends itself less to a coherent, credible, and sufficiently robust and comprehen sive general agreement.' 18 A third and most important caveat relates to the lack of explicit ethical foundations in this literature. 'Why should climate change be governed' should determine 'how it should be governed' -arbitrages are unavoidable, not only between purely national interests and ethical considerations, but also possibly between different ethical nar ratives. 20 In this strand of literature, however, ethics are addressed only as a tool to enhance legitimacy and efficiency, not as a goal on their own. In the science plan of Earth System Governance, a decennial research project led by Frank Biermann, ethics are circumscribed to a marginal discussion on 'allocation' and 'access', rather than being considered as a determinant of the necessary reform. 21 This marginalization of ethical discussions may stem from the assumption that the need to address climate change is all too obvious to be justified. However, this appeal to objectivity, as concerns for example the necessity to address climate change, eludes alternative rationales that could justify different responses to climate change, or at least different priorities. With little questioning of the rationale for the proposed law reforms, this literature adopts a managerial approach to climate change governance, eluding a host of ethical ques tions and geopolitical stakes.
B Whatever Works?
By contrast, three recent monographs attempt to develop a principled approach re conciling the fair and the feasible in the governance of climate change. 22 27 For Grasso, fairness and efficiency go hand in hand: 'the more international climate negotiations are informed by principles of jus tice, the more numerous the participants will be, and the more a manageable interna tional solution can in principle be achieved.' 28 The three books identify different ethical justifications. Grasso focuses on Rawls's theory of justice, in particular on its cosmopolitan interpretation by Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. The two other books compare several perspectives. Soltau distin guishes between five ethical approaches based respectively on equality, needs, respon sibility, capability, and status quo. 29 His view is that a convincing ethical argument should put these different models in perspective. This classification runs parallel to Posner and Weisbach's distinction between arguments based on distributive justice, corrective justice, equality, and concerns for future generations. Yet, unlike Soltau or Grasso, Posner and Weisbach reject all of these ethical narratives.
Posner and Weisbach boast that their 'argument is unusual'. 30 The authors con sider that the objective of mitigating climate change should be pursued in isolation from any other (however legitimate) concern. In particular, they submit that including 22 Other books are not discussed here but should be mentioned: J. 28 Ibid., at 3. 29 Soltau, supra note 23, at 153-163. 30 Posner and Weisbach, supra note 25, at 5.
any consideration for global inequalities would necessarily prevent a Paretooptimal agreement on mitigation. What they call the principle of 'International Paretianism' requires that 'all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of ' an international agreement on climate change mitigation. 31 Consequently, the role of fairness is essentially limited to the distribution of the economic surplus among states. Yet the authors rely on fragile assumptions, in particular on that of the pure rationality of states -neglecting the role of civil society in defining the ethical obli gations of a state. As a consequence, some of their conclusions are daunting. Since states are unequally affected by climate change and have different degrees of inter est in global cooperation, Posner and Weisbach put forward that securing an ambi tious climate agreement would call for side payments from affected states to polluting ones. 32 To draw an analogy with a famous case, could one seriously imagine the US paying Canada to reduce the environmental impacts of the Trail smelter? 33 Posner and Weisbach present their approach as one intended to ensure the political feasibility of an ambitious climate change regime, but the authors seemingly fail to consider that reverse payments will be unacceptable for developing states. Posner and Weisbach are mostly concerned with political acceptability in the US, or, as Mario Prost and Alejandra Torres Camprubi put it, with 'fairness American style'.
34 Surprisingly, all three books reject the corrective justice ('polluterpays') argu ment 35 as an ethical foundation for the international responses to climate change. Soltau considers that 'the technical philosophical concept of corrective justice does not fit comfortably with the multifaceted climate change problem, which cuts across time and space.' 36 Yet, he discusses corrective justice exclusively in relation to indi vidual behaviour, where the long and complex causal relationship between an indi vidual's behaviour and the harm resulting from climate change makes attribution difficult. By contrast, Posner and Weisbach situate the corrective justice argument at a collective level. Yet, they generally reject collective responsibility on the ground that it may result in unfair individual situations: for instance, some Indians may have a greater individual responsibility than some Americans. Here again, their argument is astonishing, as it does not take account of the widespread recognition of collective responsibility in international law even in the absence of individual responsibility, for instance through the law on state responsibility. Rejecting corrective justice arguments generally impedes cooperation on climate change matters because the alternative ethical arguments situate climate change cooperation in the voluntary language of solidarity rather than in the compulsory framework on responsibility. The difference is particularly significant with regard to climate change adaptation: if not conceived of as a corrective mechanism, adaptation finance may mean little more than a 'green' form of development cooperation. Grasso, in this regard, takes a very ambiguous position. Although he claims to reject correc tive justice and to deal only with distributive justice, 38 his argument is largely about reparation for wrongful acts. Thus, Grasso defines 'justice in funding adaptation at the international level' as 'the fair process, which involves all relevant parties, of rais ing adaptation funds according to the responsibility for climate impacts and of allocat ing them by putting the most vulnerable first'. Later on, Grasso distinguishes between 'prospective responsibility', based on capacity to help, and 'retrospective responsibil ity', based on fault without a moral element. 39 As a matter of fact, there seems to be no distinction between 'retrospective responsibility' and the concept of corrective justice (as reparation more than sanction).
Grasso's avoidance of an explicit corrective justice argument may reflect a strate gic withdrawal of the literature on fairness in climate change governance: the notion that the polluter must pay is avoided because it is seen as a deal breaker; pragmatism is considered the new way, in a desperate quest for 'whatever works'. Yet, this approach eludes the central geopolitical dimension of climate change governance, in a context of a strong gap between the historical and present responsibility of the developed coun tries and the harm caused to many developing countries. An observer noted that 'it is hard to see the justice in Posner and Weisbach's Climate Change Justice'. 40 The same observation applies, however, to Soltau and Grasso's contributions. By shying away from strong ethical arguments in terms of reparation, this literature undermines the justification for an international cooperation with regard to climate change adaptation.
Doctrinal Attempts at Defining 'Climate Law'
The previous section reviewed the literature on prospective climate change govern ance. This section now discusses the emergence of several strands of literature that attempt to define an emerging 'climate law' in a narrow sense -a set of norms form ing a special legal regime, having its own object and purposes and its own doctrine. These works, mainly doctrinal (i.e., engaging in the interpretation and systematiza tion of existing norms), are deeply affected by the failure of international negotiations in defining an ambitious legal regime. They address substantive norms on climate change mitigation established in particular by the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (A), but also issues of compliance with these norms (B), and specific forms of liability under international and municipal law (C). 38 Grasso, supra note 27, for instance at 35, 58. 39 Ibid., at 53, 55-58 (emphasis added). 40 Subramanian, book review, 10 World Trade Rev (2011) 277, at 280.
A Seeking Substance in International Climate Change Mitigation Law
Despite a recent emergence of doctrinal works on specific aspects of climate change and mitigation law, 41 there still exist few comprehensive overviews of the topic. This is perhaps not so surprising, given the relative novelty, ephemeral nature, and unpre dictable evolution of the Kyoto Protocol. 42 
B Facilitating Compliance
Another hurdle for the development of 'climate law' stems from difficulties in ensuring compliance. It recently came to the fore when Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper made clear that he did not intend to comply with the mitigation objectives of the Kyoto Protocol (before denouncing it altogether). 53 Efforts to develop an effective compliance procedure through international negotiations have led to only incre mental progress. The disillusionment of the late 2000s translated into a double conceptual shift in the literature: from 'enforcement' to 'facilitation', and finally to 'liability'.
The first shift was initiated by the growing pregnancy of the notion of 'compli ance'. As early as in 2001, the Marrakesh Accords established a compliance commit tee with both a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch. 54 Yet the literature on compliance has increasingly focused on facilitation rather than on enforcement, and on cooperation rather than confrontation, reflecting a move towards more flexibil ity. Jutta Brunnée, Meinhard Doelle, and Lavanya Rajamani, the editors of Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime, recognize that 'the GHG mitigation com mitments made thus far are inadequate and inadequately implemented'. 55 Brunnée 48 Ibid., at 249. 49 Ibid., at 234. 50 Consequently, Brunnée rejects the realist assumption of states' 'rationally assessed and pursued selfinterest', and pleads for constructivist approaches focusing on the complex interaction between norms and state conduct. 56 Jane Bulmer in the same vol ume makes a similar point in support of compliance mechanisms that 'provide a non adversarial and nonjudicial forum to promote compliance and allow parties to deal with challenges of noncompliance in a more consensual manner'. 57 Several other contributors regret that little use has been made of the facilitative branch of the Kyoto Compliance Committee. 58 As a whole, the book provides a groundbreaking discussion of key compliance issues in a transnational perspective.
C Going to Courts: Climate Liability
The second shift away from enforcement suggests that liability of actors at different levels of governance for injuries attributable to climate change can provide an alter native form of climate change governance -relying mainly on courts. Unlike enforce ment of substantive climate change norms, liability extends to tort law, administrative, constitutional, and human rights law, or even criminal law. This perspective can be found in Adjudicating Climate Change edited by William Burns and Hari Osofsky. 59 The volume explores cases in a host of different jurisdictions, ranging from the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in Australia to the ICJ. 60 Through this multiscalar perspect ive, it reveals the connections between different jurisdictional forums: local jurisdictions may inspire or pressure for a common approach, whereas international jurisprudence often influences municipal decisions. 61 Osofsky notes that, 'as this volume was being written, the number of relevant cases and their impact increased dramatically'. 62 Proving him right, two edited volumes were soon published following a similar project and a comparable method. Michael Faure and Marjan Peeters' edited volume Climate Change Liability focuses on the EU, the European Court of Human Rights, the UK, the US, and the Netherlands. 63 Going further, Richard Lord et al.'s Climate Change Liability is a massive compendium of case law originating in 17 countries (both developed and developing) and the EU. 64 The common project of these three books is the identification of the 'myriad of potential forms of liability' 65 that litigants can draw on either in order to trigger, or with the effect of triggering, actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Climate liability is climate law from below. In light of the inertia of international nego tiations, Lord et al. agree with Osofsky that some hope may be placed on courts, as 'liability arising related to climate change is developing apace and, in some jurisdic tions, on a large scale'. 66 However, liability is only conceived as a second best as -Lord et al. insist -'an international regime that involves all States and that provides for the action that science tells us is needed to avert dangerous climate change, would be the preferred approach.' 67 The limits of liability are duly recognized. Jaap Spier, for instance, highlights the risk that the dissuasive impact on polluters would be impeded if 'those involved assess as remote the chances of being held liable'. 68 Liability cer tainly cannot replace compliance with a specific set of coordinated norms aiming at climate change mitigation and adaptation. The literature on climate liability gener ally focuses on domestic jurisdictions: even though these jurisdictions can sometimes apply international law, in most cases the discussion focuses on domestic substant ive norms. Consequently the scholarly focus shifts away from international climate change governance -a trend discussed further in section 5.
The Fragmentation of Climate Change Governance: Greening International Law?
Part of the literature suggests that climate change responses impact on a multitude of different legal regimes rather than forming an integrated 'climate law' regime. Adaptation in particular calls for action across a multitude of legal regimes, cemented only by minimal institutional arrangements (most obviously some funding arrange ments). An early presentation of such an argument is Lisa Schipper's article, 'The Conceptual History of Adaptation in the UNFCCC Process'. 69 Schipper shows that 'vulnerability to climate is determined by factors [that are] very difficult to influence because they are often part of larger socioeconomic and cultural building blocks of nations'. 70 She suggests that 'adaptation policy may find a more appropriate home beyond the existing climate change regime', 71 stopping short of proposing any spe cific alternative forum. In a similar vein, J.B. Ruhl submits that 'environmental law does not "own" adaptation policy; rather, numerous policy fronts will compete simul taneously for primacy and priority as people demand protection from harms and enjoyment of benefits that play out as climate change moves relentlessly forward'.
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Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley Scott, editors of the recent volume, International Law in the Era of Climate Change (2012), develop a similar argument. At the outset, they note that 'climate change will, in many cases, serve to exacerbate existing problems, functioning as a threat multiplier or one factor in a complex process of causation'.
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The book reveals how responses to climate change are and could be mainstreamed throughout a host of legal regimes such as human rights law, refugee law, trade and investment law, environmental law, law of the sea, space law, humanitarian law, and law on the use of force.
The following subsections identify three broad strands of literature on the articu lation of climate change governance within the existing regimes of human rights, development, and migration law. The discussion shows how the fragmentation of cli mate change governance may jeopardize the objective of climate change adaptation. Two opposite scenarios are identified as problematic: mainstreaming climate change or reinventing the wheels of international law. On the one hand, climate change law (or aspects thereof) may be mainstreamed into other regimes: it could for instance become a footnote in development policies. While benefitting from potential synergies, this might lead to silencing the corrective justice argument for an ambitious effort at promoting climate change adaptation. On the other hand, human rights, devel opment, and migration issues exacerbated by climate change are often discussed in isolation from larger preexisting debates. This is in particular the case with regard to 'climate migration', which the literature tends to address as though 'environmental migrants' could be distinguished from other forced migrants.
A Mainstreaming Human Rights and Development in Responses to Climate Change
Part of the literature on climate change looks at the relation of climate change with human rights law. A rich collection of insightful reflections can be found in the volume Human Rights and Climate Change edited by Stephen Humphreys. 74 The contributions elaborate on different conceptions of 'human rights': as law, a project, or something in between. Simon Caney, for instance, deals with human rights as a social phenomenon, a set of absolute claims that should supersede any consideration of costs. 75 At the other end of the spectrum, Dina Shelton mentions the technical 'problems of stand ing, justiciability, ripeness and causality' in human rights adjudication in the context 71 Ibid., at 82. 72 77 An even more prolific strand of the literature deals with the relations of climate change and development, including no fewer than three recent edited volumes that reveal a similar set of arguments and perspectives. First, Lael Brainard, Abigail Jones, and Nigel Purvis's Climate Change and Global Poverty gathers contributions by a large range of brilliant researchers from all over the world to highlight the commonalities of climate and development agendas. 78 The editors argue in particular that 'success on both fronts is inextricably linked to progress on each one'. 79 Secondly, Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development Cooperation, edited by Joyeeta Gupta and Nicolien van der Grijp, provides insights into the law and practices of the EU in a global context, at the convergence of development and climate change. 80 Gupta and van der Grijp in particular analyse the climate change regime as 'the latest forum for North-South stress, where old grievances like colonialism and new ones like neoimperialism merge in a complex pot of interdependence and yet distrust'. 81 They highlight that climate change and development have in common to call for asymmetrical obligations founded on an ambiguous reasoning -partly on the greater capacity of Western countries, and partly on a touch of responsibility. 82 In this context, the two editors note a shift in the conception of climate change, from an 'abstract, technocratic, sectorial, mitiga tion issue' to an 'urgent, development, political, adaptation issue'. 83 Thirdly, Poverty Alleviation and Environmental Law was edited by Yves Le Bouthillier and colleagues fol lowing a conference organized in Mexico City by the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law exploring the role of law in regulating the complex relationship between poverty and environmental protection. Its 14 chapters include theoretical contributions and case studies on issues such as the specific situation of aboriginal peoples, the need for public participation, and the role of environmental courts. A last section is specifically dedicated to climate change and poverty alleviation. 84 These four books share the same starting point: the unquestionable existence of overlaps between climate change law and human rights law or development law respectively. An ensuing argument is that coordination could develop synergies between those regimes. These synergies are particularly highlighted in relation to development. For instance, Jones, LaFleur, and Purvis suggest that synergies are poss ible, for instance, with regard to the governance of tropical forests, agriculture, health, and disaster risk reduction. 85 Michael Jenkin further elaborates on the opportunities of cooperation in forestry, highlighting the phenomenal potential of carbon offsets projects both to avoid GHG emissions and to channel significant North-South finan cial aid to development. 86 Similarly, Humphreys phrases a wish that 'State obligations under the human rights and climate change regime -though they differ markedly -may turn out to be complementary', 87 and he denounces the 'near complete disciplinary disconnect' between human rights and climate change. 88 Yet, in the discussion of development and climate change, some authors develop a more demanding claim. They argue that synergies between law on development and climate change are the rule, while oppositions between these priorities are excep tional. For instance, Atiq Rahman argues against all odds that 'mitigating climate change, eradicating poverty, and promoting economic growth and political stability all demand the same solution: we must kick the carbon habit'. 89 Similarly, according to Daniel Behn, 'an opportunity has emerged in the twentyfirst century to both eradi cate extreme poverty and stabilize the planet that we collectively inhabit'. 90 As con cerns potential conflict between climate change and development law, Jones, LaFleur, and Purvis content themselves with a rapid and heavily understated acknowledgment that, 'sometimes, mitigation and development goals might seem to conflict'. 91 Such wishful thinking underestimates the unavoidable oppositions between divergent pri orities in a world with limited resources.
By contrast, the perspective on human rights and climate change developed in Humphreys' volume duly recognizes the tensions between the two spheres of govern ance -perhaps because human rights lawyers are used to the need for accommodat ing diverging interests. Suggesting that human rights protection and climate change mitigation or adaptation may be competing goals, Humphreys argues that the human rights regime needs to take climate change into account because 'the injustice of cli mate change effects is such that the failure of human rights to provide effective remedy can only work against their current hegemonic status (or aspiration)' as a language of justice. 92 Overall, Humphreys recognizes certain essential inconsistencies between the two spheres of governance, such as between human rights' deontological roots and climate change's utilitarian approach. 93 This assessment of the hurdles in reconciling different regimes with diverging priorities is essential; by contrast, the wishful empha sis on 'winwin' solutions in the literature on climate change and development results in a dearth of muchneeded discussions on the harder cases where compromises are unavoidable.
B Migration as Adaptation: Reinventing Migration through Green Lenses?
Yet another strand of literature deals with the encounter of climate change and migra tion. Two recent monographs, in particular, discuss national and international poli cies with regard to human displacements 'caused' by climate change. Gregory White's Security and Borders in a Warming World: Climate Change and Migration provides an insightful critique of the conception of climateinduced migration as a security con cern calling for increased border and migration control.
94 Substantially influenced by de Tocqueville's thoughts on modern democracies, White denounces the relative ease with which popular support is attracted for 'simple' solutions such as building fences and enhancing the capacity of transit states, despite all evidence of their longterm inefficacy. He suggests that this detracts attention from other necessary efforts, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation.
95 Jane McAdam's Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law is an extensive and wellinformed doctrinal discussion of different legal regimes. 96 It aims at examining 'the scope of existing international law to respond to climate changerelated movement, and to identify its potential for future development and expansion'. 97 The book is informed by fieldwork in Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Bangladesh, and it leads to a normative argument for a rightsbased gov ernance of climate migration.
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The two authors concur in denouncing the oftenheard discourse on 'climate refu gees' forced to flee countries flooded as a consequence of climate change as 'simplistic and often illinformed'. 99 However, both authors fail to escape some of these miscon ceptions themselves. Thus, although they insist -on the basis of consistent empirical works -that migration induced or exacerbated by climate changerelated phenom ena is 'likely to be internal, rather than across international borders', 100 most of their discussion is circumscribed to international migration. 101 This neglect of internal dis placement is in spite of the longlasting endeavour of international human rights law 93 to protect internal migrants -reminding us that the general human rights entitlement does not always translate into effective protection: internal migrants, just like interna tional ones, do require specific protection. 102 Moreover, when calling for specific policies to be developed to address 'climate migration', McAdam (and, to a lesser extent, White) assumes that it is possible to distinguish 'climate migrants' from other migrants. This seems, however, impossible because, as McAdam observes herself, 'it is … conceptually problematic and empiri cally flawed to suggest that climate change alone causes migration'. 103 Indeed, the task of identifying those migrants 'caused' by climate change would face two successive issues of causation. First, climate change does not 'cause' any environmental event in a binary ('all or nothing') manner -such phenomena become only more likely (or more frequent) in the context of climate change. Secondly, migration studies tell us that migration is generally not induced by environmental events alone, but rather by a cluster of economic, social, political, demographic, and environmental cir cumstances. 104 As a consequence, one can identify neither the specific drought that would not have occurred absent climate change, nor in general the specific individual migrants who would not have moved or would have moved differently in the absence of such a drought. 105 Therefore, the circumstances where migrants could reasonably be identified as 'caused' by climate change are exceptional. 106 More fundamentally, neither McAdam nor White develops a sound ethical argu ment for the protection of climate migrants. Both authors seem concerned primarily by the vulnerability of climate migrants, but they are isolated from a broader argu ment for the protection of equally vulnerable 'economic' or 'development refugees', or from proposals for a protection framework for 'survival migration'. 107 If the authors are concerned by the vulnerability of migrants, there is no reason to limit the argu ment to climate migrants (except for a naïve illusion that international refugee law suf ficiently addresses all other forced migration). Alternatively, the call for a protection of climate migrants could follow a corrective justice argument justifying an obligation for polluting states to repair the loss and damage caused to other states. Yet, it is not clear how a corrective justice argument at the interstate level could translate into obligations of a state toward individuals. 108 Thus, the literature on 'migration as adaptation' runs the risk of reinventing the wheels of the governance of migration and of artificially isolating a 'green' argument from broader debates. Neither 'mainstreaming' climate change in the development regime nor isolating the governance of climaterelated migration responds to the essential need for a coordination of climate change governance with existing regimes.
A Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change?
Rather than forming a coherent legal regime, the governance of climate change inex tricably appears as part of a complex set of norms and compromises across a variety of regimes. At the same time the governance of climate change struggles to affirm itself as an independent legal regime.
Part of the literature attempts to overcome the difficulties stemming from a lack of farreaching cooperation and the implication of climate change mitigation and adaptation in all domains of governance and to comprehend the global governance of climate change by applying innovative frameworks of analysis. This literature goes beyond a doctrinal analysis of the specific norms relating to climate change or a coor dination of those norms with existing regimes. Instead, it tackles the conceptual chal lenge of mapping the many norms and their implementation, the policies and actions, even discourses and representations that frame the overall response of human societ ies to climate change. It deals not only with law, but also with other instruments of governance: the classical structure of international law is questioned for the benefit of function. Ultimately, this literature aims at identifying possibilities of furthering effec tive responses to climate change.
A significant example of such an approach is Robert Keohane and David Victor's article, 'The Regime Complex for Climate Change'. 109 Keohane and Victor argue that, despite the efforts of states at crafting 'a strong, integrated and comprehensive regu latory system for managing climate change', the result so far has been limited to 'a varied array of narrowlyfocused regulatory regimes'. 110 According to the authors, three factors explain such dispersion: the distribution of interests among powerful states, the scientific uncertainty relating to climate change, and the possible linkages with nonclimate issues.
111 Yet, Keohane and Victor argue, a regime complex also has advantages over an integrated one, in particular because it provides greater 'flexibility across issues' and 'adaptability over time '. 112 Thus, their support for a regime complex is essentially based on a pragmatic quest for 'whatever works', as opposed to a quest for 'climate justice'. The authors are sceptical towards the role of fairness in interna tional relations. They write that, 'since multilateral institutions always reflect dispari ties of power and interests, they never perfectly reflect abstract normative standards of fairness, and should not be evaluated on the basis of whether they achieve this utopian objective'.
113 A central argument of the authors is that there is no need for an integrated climate change regime because climate change governance deals with an array of dis tinct problems that can be dealt with in different regimes. In particular, they identify four independent problems: 'coordination of emission regulations', 'compensation … for countries that are not willing or unable to adopt emission controls', 'coordination of efforts to brace a changing climate', and 'coordination of common scientific assess ments'. Each of these problems, they argue, has its 'own attributes, administrative challenges, and distinctive political constituencies'. 114 Yet, Keohane and Victor come to this conclusion only because they deny the role of ethical criteria in defining what a climate regime should be. By doing so, they neglect the very reason for the existence of a law of climate change: the guarantee of an equal right of all nations, all individuals, to enjoy their existence.
Whereas Keohane and Victor address only the global aspects of the governance of climate change, others develop a multilevel analysis. In particular, Gerd Winter's vol ume, The Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change, highlights the need to look at all levels of governance and at all institutional arrangements (possibly) contrib uting to the global responses to climate change. 115 The contributions to Winter's vol ume offer a multidisciplinary approach to governance at the local, national, regional, and global levels. They explore aspects ranging from the challenges to compliance in developing countries, 116 to the diffusion of environmental policy innovations, 117 and to the exemplary role of the EU. 118 The notion of transnational governance provides a slightly more comprehensive frame of analysis, taking into account the diverse interactions between public and private actors within and across national borders. 119 Such a transnational approach is evidenced by Kenneth Abbott's landmark article 'The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change', which maps the regime resulting from the '"Cambrian explosion" in transnational climate change governance'. 120 Building upon Keohane and Victor, Abbott argues that climate governance has become not only complex and diversi fied, but also decentralized. The recent launch of the Transnational Environmental Law journal evidences the success of this perspective. Its inaugural issue contributes to setting the stage for a new paradigm: the recognition of the 'proliferation of sites of governance', 121 an emphasis on adaptation, a great openness to comparative legal methodology, 122 a reflection on the articulation of global, domestic, local, and vol untary regulation, an underlying quest for efficiency in a context of limited politi cal resources and great governance needs, and a recognition of the challenge of legitimacy. 123 Both concepts of multilevel and transnational governance emphasize the comple mentarity of different forums of governance. This emphasis may certainly be inter preted as a consequence of a growing scholarly dissatisfaction with international cooperation on climate change issues altogether. Thus, part of the literature has submitted that downscaling international governance could open new opportunities for more efficient and legitimate governance. It accompanies a proliferation of works that aim at revealing the possibility to govern climate change without an international law of climate change. For instance, Lorraine Elliott and Shaun Breslin's Comparative Environmental Regionalism shows that forms of regional cooperation on environmen tal matters have been developing in virtually all regions of the world. 124 , depicting international law generally as a 'poor framework' lacking 'an effective enforcement system', therefore unable to provide the binding standards needed for adaptation. 127 In many cases, however, a repressed desire for international cooperation or at least coordination reemerges within the literature on downscaled climate change governance through the notion that any isolated initiative should spur further action by others. This emulation is particularly evident in the discussion on voluntary regimes, through which local authorities or private entities voluntarily commit themselves to specific mitigation or adaptation objectives. Yet, emulation may also be expected from the exemplary action of a specific actor. In this regard, a literature has developed on the role of the EU. In par ticular, The European Union as a Leader in International Climate Change Politics, edited by Rüdiger Wurzel and James Connelly, shows that Europe has developed 'entrepreneurial leadership' (the ability to facilitate agreements through negotiations) and 'cognitive lead ership' (the ability to define the perception of a phenomenon and the interests of differ ent actors), but continues to lack 'structural leadership' (the ability to constrain action), which accordingly resulted in the failure of the Copenhagen summit. 128 Such arguments have fuelled criticisms based on the lack of legitimacy of European institutions to impose their decisions on other actors. Regarding the extension of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to aviation activities, for instance, Scott and Rajamani's article on 'EU Climate Change Unilateralism' denounced the European 'strategy of "con tingent unilateralism"' that according to the authors consists of applying EU law to GHG emissions generated abroad until third states or international institutions impose similar regulations. 129 Interestingly, Scott and Rajamani highlight the inconsistency of such an action with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, as the EU legisla tion failed to treat flights connecting developing countries differently. 130 Decentralized governance exacerbates inequalities of powers, thus further isolating developing coun tries from global politics. Regarding climate change governance more particularly, Scott and Rajamani highlight the risk of an oversight of the interhemispheric dimension of climate change. If the governance of climate change is not about holding the polluters responsible for the harm they cause, what is it worth?
The literature on climate change and international law has taken a disturbing turn over the last few years, as the ethical rationales for actually doing something have been neglected. Principled approaches to climate change governance often boil down to a desperate quest for 'whatever works' that shadows stronger ethical arguments on the responsibility of polluting states. In this perspective, climate change adaptation is bound to remain conceived as a charitable appendix to a climate mitigation regime, which would itself be circumscribed to the minimal common denominator of what individual states consider to be in their best interests. The project of climate law requires more than that: it calls for a foundational momentum spurring sacrifices guided by the ethics of international affairs, for the human family must learn to share limited global resources in an increasingly independent world. A strong ethical narrative needs to be reinvented to guide and inspire the development of climate change mitigation and adaptation.
Selected References
A New Journals
